From Breadbasket to Dust Bowl: Rural Credit, the World War I Plow-Up, and the Transformation of American Agriculture by Gregg, Sara M.
 
From Breadbasket to Dust Bowl: 
Rural Credit, the World War I Plow-Up, and the Transformation of American Agriculture 
 
 
Sara M. Gregg 
Associate Professor of History 
University of Kansas 
3650 Wescoe Hall 
1445 Jayhawk Blvd 





  2 
 
 
From Breadbasket to Dust Bowl: 




As the clouds of world war rumbled across Europe during the summer of 1914, the United States Congress debated 
the future of American agriculture, and specifically, how the federal government might intervene in the banking 
system in order to support agricultural production.  At stake were significant questions about the influence of the 
nation-state:  did the national government have the authority to assist in the expansion of mortgage credit to rural 
producers, who had limited access to long-term loans from regional banks and insurance companies?  Should the 
reforms to the banking system that had been passed through the 1913 Federal Reserve Act be extended into the 
agricultural industry?  What should be the future of rural development:  farm consolidation, large-scale 
mechanization, or a commitment to a diffuse network of small-scale, low-technology farms?  For decades, farmers 
had argued that they suffered from limited local credit markets, and many argued that they were constrained from 
expanding their operations because of the dearth of lenders willing to invest in agricultural improvement.  Members 
of Congress embraced this cause, and for a few years, legislators negotiated the terms of a radical expansion of 
federal intervention in the rural economy.  
In 1916 Congress established provided a mechanism that proved crucial to the reorganization of American 
agriculture with the passage of the Federal Farm Loan Act.  This legislation appropriated funds from the U. S. 
Treasury to create a network of regional land banks that extended government-seeded, long-term, low-interest-rate 
mortgages on land and improvements.  This program provided financing for American farms, building upon the 
precedent of decades of subsidies to railroads, homesteading, agricultural research, and irrigation.1  During the 
crucial years of World War I these farm loans allowed expansion-minded American farmers to invest in new 
machines, consolidate operations, and modernize their facilities in order to produce ever-higher yields.  Federal land 
banks financed agriculture at a moment of economic and technological transformation and, as a result, they spurred 
a material transformation in the nation’s rural economy.   
This article interrogates the Federal Farm Loan Act’s impact on the southern Great Plains, where land 
banks invested the majority of farm mortgages during the late 1910s.  By surveying the larger history of federal farm 
loans, this study asserts the impact of the federal land banks on wartime American agriculture.  After 1917, the new 
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federal land banks distributed millions of dollars in loans to wheat farmers on the Great Plains.  The sudden 
availability of long-term, low-interest-rate mortgages in these historically undercapitalized lending markets funded 
the purchase of machinery, the consolidation of farms, and the unprecedented expansion of wheat acreage during 
World War I, a confluence of events known as the Great Plow-Up.2  These government-seeded mortgages provided 
capital that proved crucial for transforming agriculture and played a significant role in modernizing farms on the 
Great Plains, proving key for the further consolidation and industrialization of American agriculture.  At the same 
time, the federal government’s intervention in the rural credit market also sought to neutralize the historical climatic 
and economic vulnerabilities that had discouraged lending in the region.  Ultimately, the new land bank loans 
facilitated the push to plant the Plains in wheat, both severing the deep roots that had held the soil on the land for 
millennia and injecting a new reservoir of capital onto the dryland farms of the region.  
Scholarly analyses of the impacts of World War I on the American homefront have featured the expansion 
of federal control over transportation networks, food policy, and political dissent.  Yet despite the considerable 
literature on wartime conditions, scholars have overlooked one of the most pronounced and long-lasting effects of 
this transformation:  the evolving relationship between agricultural producers and the state.  Vastly increased 
production was the most material consequence of this reshaping of the rural landscape, and it reordered the 
relationship between the United States and its allies while creating surpluses of grain and cotton that would vex 
agricultural policymakers for decades.  In brief, the larger geopolitical context of the Great War in Europe 
precipitated fundamental changes in the economic and agro-environmental practices of American farmers.3  These 
new practices were hailed for their increased efficiency and the maximization of resources, and most Americans 
embraced them as the benefits of a modernizing age, not anticipating the long-term economic and ecological impacts 
that were the unintended consequences of these policies.4 
Scholars have glossed over the causal forces at play in the transformation of American agriculture during 
this period, and yet the interplay between finance and environmental change was of paramount importance.  
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Whereas some environmental historians have examined the environmental impacts of agriculture, they too 
frequently ignore the economic mechanisms through which farms have expanded.5  Similarly, while agricultural 
historians have devoted a great deal of attention to the cultivation of commodity crops and the social dynamics in 
rural areas, they have neglected the financial networks that funded industrializing agriculture.6  Economic historians 
have acknowledged the market mechanisms that encouraged agricultural expansion, but they have failed to realize 
the larger ecosystemic effects of these changes alongside the ways in which economic programs of one era drove the 
market collapse of another.7  For their part, policy historians have paid a great deal of attention to this era of 
governmental expansion, but without integrating a regional context that explains the social, environmental, and 
economic impacts of agricultural policy.8  This article builds upon the literature within these fields by highlighting 
the impact of federally subsidized lending on the rural economy and illustrating how these new farm loans played an 
instrumental role in reshaping the landscape of production agriculture in the twentieth century.  
The 1916 Federal Farm Loan Act offered a mechanism for the reorganization of the rural economy that 
complemented other centralizing initiatives of the period, including the 1913 Federal Reserve Act, the 1914 Smith-
Lever Act, and the 1916 Federal-Aid Road Act.9  This legislation sought to correct inequities in the farm mortgage 
market and “overcome the chaos, dysfunctions, and inequities of the unfettered market by creating new capacities 
for administrative control within the federal government.”10  The injection of government capital facilitated the 
modernization of tens of thousands of farms, increased the pace of mechanization in the wheat and corn belts, and 
drove the capitalization of rural districts.  Over eight months in 1917 the federal land banks extended almost thirty 
million dollars in new farm loans, injecting an infusion of credit into the rural economy that contributed materially 
not only to the massive gains in production during the war but also to the rapid transformation of the Great Plains 
and Midwest.11   
The federal government’s 1916 intervention in rural credits proved instrumental to increasing staple crop 
production, creating unprecedented agricultural surpluses, and paving the way for new regulatory initiatives in the 
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11 Federal Farm Loan Board, First Annual Report of the Federal Farm Loan Board (Washington, 1918), 30. 
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following decades.  The global increases in acreage and productivity that erupted during the war years eventually 
yielded too much wheat, especially after 1920 when European markets no longer demanded vast quantities of 
American grain.  Ultimately, the new farm loan system contributed to the surpluses that emerged as the nation’s 
principal agricultural policy dilemma after World War I.12 The problem of surplus subsequently reshaped American 
food policy and agricultural politics during the challenging decades of the 1920s and 1930s and into the twenty-first 
century.  These broader impacts merit consideration as we seek to evaluate the consequences of World War I, the 
postwar economic contraction, the paralyzing drought and dust storms of the 1930s, and subsequent federal 
interventions in the agricultural economy.13  
 
Seeding a System of Rural Credits  
Limited access to mortgage loans had significant repercussions in rural America, and at the turn of the 
twentieth century American farmers suffered from the coupled disadvantages of high interest rates and the general 
scarcity of rural credit.  The farm press, agricultural economists, and farm leaders had long argued that national 
credit markets underserved farmers, which constrained them in their attempts to modernize.  After the turn of the 
twentieth century the limited availability of credit on the Southern Plains materially restricted farmers’ ability to 
invest in improvements.  Whereas the Farmers’ Alliance had mobilized to promote the interests of farmers during 
the 1880s and 1890s, organizing to provide new avenues for cooperative marketing and purchasing, many of these 
rural cooperatives had faltered on the heels of the political defeat of the People’s Party.14  As a result, farmers relied 
upon prosperous neighbors, large national banks, and life insurance companies to fund most farm mortgages, but for 
terms of only a few months to a few years, a reflection the economic interests of these investors.  Because credit 
markets generally operated on a short term, yet farm managers required longer-term loans in order to buy new land 
or machinery, the sources of credit and the needs of the farmer were perpetually mismatched.  As a result, loans to 
farmers were rarely sufficient to ensure the increases in efficiency urged by agricultural reformers.15  Moreover, 
                                                 
12 Farmers realized a 52% reduction in real net farm income in 1921, as world grain markets adjusted to postwar 
conditions.  American wheat exports fell by 60% between 1920 and 1923, as American farmers competed with 
wheat producers in Canada, Argentina, Australia, Russia, and Europe during the years after the war.  Laurie Winn 
Carlson, William J. Spillman and the Birth of Agricultural Economics (Columbia, 2005), 121; Bruce Gardner, 
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(March 1929): 450-53; Frederic L. Paxson, “The Agricultural Surplus:  A Problem in History,” Agricultural History 
6 (April 1932):  51-68; William Winders, The Politics of Food Supply:  U. S. Agricultural Policy and the World 
Economy (New Haven, 2009), 37, 39. 
13 Ultimately, in 1933 the nation embarked on a new program of agricultural payments for reduced production that 
has defined agriculture ever since. Hamilton, From New Day to New Deal; Ladd Haystead and Gilbert Fite, The 
Agricultural Region of the United States (Norman, 1955), 179, 197-98; Donald C. Horton and E. Fenton Shepard, 
“Federal Aid to Agriculture Since World War I,” Agricultural History 19 (April 1945): 114-120; William E. 
Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York, 1963, 2009). 
14 Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment (New York, 1978); Miner, Next Year Country, 31-42. 
15 Most insurance company loans to agriculture, for example, were extended for a period of five to seven years on a 
non-amortized basis—in other words, borrowers paid regular interest payments, but the principal (the amount 
borrowed) was due in one lump payment at the end of the term of the loan.  As agricultural economist Taylor 
emphasized, insurance companies were well suited to investing in farm mortgages:  “agents are usually men who 
know the local situation thoroughly…. The insurance company is in no hurry for its money, hence it prefers long-
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even when mortgage credit was available, it often came at cripplingly high rates of interest.  Rural lenders rarely 
competed for mortgages, and national credit markets found few incentives for catering to farmers’ specialized 
borrowing needs.  
 
<Ins. Fig. 1 here—Cover of The Banker-Farmer, July 1916, highlighting the difference between “Farmer 
Smith” and “Farmer Jones.”  In this cartoon the artist elaborated on the time-honored practice of comparing types of 
farmers, who were frequently characterized as “Farmer Snug” and “Farmer Slack.”  In this version, however, the 
artist offers a pointed commentary on how farm practices affected each operation’s credit.  The Banker-Farmer 3 
(July 1916)>  
 
Farmers, policymakers, and even rural bankers across the nation—as well as from throughout the political 
spectrum—agreed that some form of systemic reform was needed in order to free up capital for rural 
improvements.16  During the 1910s farm journals were replete with editorials, testimonials, and proposals focused 
on the necessity of improving the farmer’s access to capital to invest in improvements.17  As one early historian of 
rural credits described the situation:  “Something was plainly wrong with agriculture….  The agricultural revolution 
had come, cheap land was gone, farm land commanded absolute and relatively high prices, the cost of equipment 
had soared, and the passing from extensive to intensive farming necessitated more capital for farm operations.  
Credit was necessary in order to obtain capital.”  Yet while he path to an increasingly business-like agriculture relied 
on an expanded credit market, and modernizers stressed the potential for rural improvement, farm mortgages simply 
were not accessible to many farmers, even as reformers envisioned the social and cultural possibilities of new credit 
for industrializing agriculture.18   
The nation’s growing contingent of agricultural experts was quick to connect limited credit with lack of 
innovation, and they were foremost among the advocates for an expanded system of rural lending.  Henry C. Taylor, 
the American founder of the discipline of agricultural economics, argued in an early edition of his textbook, “Farm 
credit is essential to good agriculture.”  Yet Taylor observed that bankers in rural communities generally only 
extended short-term loans suitable for merchants and manufacturers that were incompatible with farmers’ longer-
                                                                                                                                                             
time loans.”  Henry C. Taylor, “Farm Credit and the Rate of Interest,” in Agricultural Economics (New York, 1920), 
180; Testimony of Jacob Badsky, Lawrence, to the Federal Farm Loan Board, Topeka, Kans., 18 September 1916, p. 
101.  RG 103, 530:  54/10-11/00, Entry 4, Federal Farm Loan Board:  Minutes of Hearings, 1916.  NARA, College 
Park; George Putnam, “Farm Credit in Kansas,” American Economic Review 5 (March 1915), 27.  
16 A variety of ideas had been circulating in rural America, and in 1909, the U. S. Country Life Commission had 
included in its report to Congress a recommendation for a system of cooperative credit that would privilege rural and 
agricultural borrowers, who had long funded mortgages in towns with their own savings deposits.  Report of the 
Country Life Commission: special message from the President of the United States transmitting the report of the 
Country Life Commission (Washington, 1909), 58. 
17 Of the hundreds of editorials, letters to the editor, and reports on the credit system, a sampling suffices to survey 
the political and economic landscape.  Editorial, “Rural Credits and the Banker,” Banker-Farmer 3 (May 1916):  8; 
Editorial Comment, “The Problem of Credit,” Successful Farming 15 (July 1914):  1; “Credit for Farmers,” 
Wallace’s Farmer (5 September 1914), 1203. 
18 Arthur Francis Pottle, “A History of the Federal Farm Loan Act,” MS Thesis, Iowa State College, 1928, 6-7; 
Joseph G. Knapp, The Rise of American Cooperative Enterprise, 1620-1920 (Danville, Ill., 1969). 
  7 
term credit needs.  Consequently, he concluded, “the bank is too rarely a farmers’ credit institution.”19  The paucity 
of long-term loans at competitive rates meant that capital for the improvements to farm buildings, livestock, 
machinery, and crops urged by the land grant colleges was inaccessible for many farmers. This disparity impeded 
farmers from adopting the economies of scale, modern machines, and new practices that Taylor and other experts 
argued were crucial for securing a resilient and productive agricultural sector.   
  
The Politics of Rural Credit  
By 1912 the calls for a new approach to rural credit had reached the highest levels of government, and the 
national party platforms of the Republican, Democratic, and Progressive parties all included a call for investigating 
new methods for improving rural credit.20  Reflecting this growing consensus, in the spring of 1913 Congress 
authorized the appointment of the U. S. Commission and charged it with investigating the necessity for a system to 
improve rural access to credit.  The Commission’s 1913 report cited jarringly high rates of interest on farm 
mortgages, and noted significant regional variation that had a profound impact on agricultural production.21  Farmers 
in the Deep South, the Great Plains, and the Pacific Northwest operated at a particular disadvantage:  rural interest 
rates averaged 10% in Montana and Wyoming; 9.6% in Arkansas and Florida; 9% in Utah and Texas; 8.9% in 
Colorado and Idaho; 8.7% in Georgia, North Dakota, and Washington; meanwhile, rates ranged between 8 and 8.6% 
in Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Oregon.22  The going rate for business 
loans in New York City, by contrast, was 4.5%, and the new Federal Reserve was extending government credit to 
regional banks at 3%.23  The cost to farmers was debilitating, and the Wall Street Journal estimated in 1913 that the 
nation’s twelve million farmers, who had a gross income of $5.8 billion, were paying an estimated $510 million a 
year in interest on borrowed capital.24  Farmers were often paying interest rates twice those of urban businessmen, 
and there was too little capital available for fully modernizing their operations.  Even President Woodrow Wilson, 
                                                 
19 Taylor, “Farm Credit and the Rate of Interest,” 178-79. 
20 The Democrats simply supported the deployment of the investigatory U. S. Commission to Europe, which had 
been charged with researching European cooperative credit systems like the French Crédit Agricole and the German 
Raiffeisen.  The Progressive platform pledged “to foster the development of agricultural credit and co-operation” 
and the Republicans recommended “the passage of State and Federal laws for the establishment and capable 
supervision of organizations having for their purpose the loaning of funds to farmers.”  “Democratic Party Platform 
of 1912,” 25 June 1912, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29590 (accessed 25 September 2012); “Progressive Party 
Platform of 1912,” 5 November 1912, The American Presidency Project, “Republican Party Platform of 1912,”18 
June 1912, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29617 (accessed 
25 September 2012); http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=29633 (accessed 25 September 2012); 
Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York, 1954), 57; R. C. Milliken, “A 
Rural Credit System,” Banker-Farmer (November 1914), 10. 
21 Institute for Government Research, The Federal Farm Loan Bureau:  Its History, Activities, and Organization 
Service Monographs of the United States Government No. 34 (Baltimore, 1924), 7. 
22 Herbert Quick, “The Rural Credit Firing Squad,” Saturday Evening Post (April 15, 1916), p. 30, figures cited 
Link, Wilson:  The New Freedom, 261. 
23 “Controller Urges Remedy for Usury,” New York Times, 11 January 1916, p. 4.  
24 The Journal calculated this sum at an average interest rate of 8 ½ %. “High Rural Interest Rates,” Wall Street 
Journal, 1 January 1913, p. 6.  Figure for gross agricultural income in 1913 comes from Willford I. King et al., 
Income in the United States, Its Amount and Distribution, 1909-1919 (New York:  National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1921), 18-19. 
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the resolute defender of the principle of “special privileges to none,” readily acknowledged the damage inadequate 
credit markets did to rural Americans, and sought a solution that might allow the nation might correct for this 
disparity.25 
 
Politicians in Congress recognized the need to channel long-term credit to farmers more efficiently and 
cheaply, and yet they contested vigorously which mechanisms for achieving this market readjustment were most 
consistent with American values.  Farm leaders wanted a system of rural credit organized, underwritten, and 
administered by the federal government.  The agrarians in Congress proposed that federal investment in the lending 
marketplace would create a more equitable system, insulated from the extortionate rates of commercial lenders, 
which could be used to guarantee farmers low interest rates on long-term mortgages.  At first, President Wilson 
rejected this program, arguing that it clashed with the concept of a “New Freedom” that lay at the heart of his 
political philosophy.26  
The gulf between the proposals dominating Congress and the political philosophy within the Wilson White 
House was vast.  President Wilson sought to govern according to his “very deep conviction that it is unwise and 
unjustifiable to extend the credit of the Government to a single class of the community.”  Secretary of Agriculture 
David Houston further clarified the administration’s position on rural credits in a speech to the National Grange:  “I 
am not impressed with the wisdom and the justice of proposals that would take the money of all the people, through 
bonds or other devices, and lend it to the farmers or to any other class at a rate of interest lower than the economic 
conditions would normally require and lower than that at which other classes are securing their capital.  This would 
be special legislation of a particularly odious type.”  Instead, Wilson, Houston, and a range of fiscal conservatives 
championed an alternative program for improving rural credit:  a voluntary, cooperative system that was wholly 
financed by private interests, designed to serve those farmers who were best positioned to improve their 
operations.27  
 As often transpires in election years, however, political considerations forced Wilson to reconsider his 
stance on rural credits during 1916.  The Midwestern farmers who were most outspoken in their support for a system 
of government finance represented a voting bloc critical for securing Wilson’s reelection.  For example, Frank Odell 
of Omaha, Nebraska, the Secretary of the American Rural Credits Association, gave a well-publicized speech in 
January 1916 in New York City that warned:  “If the Democratic Party fails to give suitable legislation on the 
subject it will hurt itself greatly with the farmers, especially in the Middle West.”  Odell predicted that this would 
arise as a critical issue in the coming election season, suggesting that Democrats cultivate the farm vote in order to 
                                                 
25 Echoing William Jennings Bryan in 1913, Wilson observed, “It is from the quiet interspaces of the open valleys 
and the free hillsides that we draw the sources of life and prosperity, from the farms and the ranch, from the forest 
and the mine.  Without these every street would be silent, every office deserted, every factory fallen to disrepair.  
And yet, the farmer does not stand on the same footing with the forester and miner in the market for credit.”  
Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era:  Years of Peace (Chapel Hill, 1944), 233. 
26 Link, Wilson:  The New Freedom, 261. 
27 Link, Wilson:  The New Freedom, 262-63. 
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“offset the pro-German vote which will be solidly Republican.”28  The war in Europe influenced the economic as 
well as the political scene, and provided the rationale for Wilson to revise his position on government intervention in 
the rural credit market. 
Throughout 1916, reminders about the urgency of reorganizing rural finance circulated in Congress and in 
the national press.  In January, the Comptroller of the Currency reported to Congress on the often-usurious interest 
rates offered by rural banks, exposing rates reaching as high as 20-1000%.  The New York Times summarized the 
report:  “The most excessive interest rates are being charged by the small banks in rural communities.  Especially in 
the South and Southwest, the West and the Northwest many bitter complaints have been received of excessive 
interest charged the farmers and others engaged in agriculture.  In many instances the exactions of the money 
lenders make it impossible for the farmer to live comfortably and pay the banks the enormous rates demanded for 
the use of the money needed to produce his crops.”29  These loans were repeatedly rolled over and refinanced, thus 
perpetually limiting the capital of aspiring farmer-businessmen.  The clear implication was that the diffuse 
populations and limited resources of the underdeveloped parts of the country were holding farmers—and the 
nation—back.  
  
<Ins fig. 2 here, Average rates for farm interest and commissions, July 1916, featuring the highly variable interest 
rates and rates of annual commission by state.  From Thompson, “Costs and Sources of Farm-Mortgage Loans,” 9> 
 
The agrarian myth remained strong in popular culture, and farmers were celebrated in the halls of Congress 
and the popular press for their contributions to national prosperity, their diligence, and their thrift.  Yet all too often 
the markets that depended on the productivity of individual farms did not align with the rural producer’s own 
economic interests.  The Comptroller of the Currency’s 1916 report stressed that “the farmer has been and is obliged 
to pay, in thousands of cases, not only twice the rate of interest usually charged in the cities to merchants and 
manufacturers, where the risk is just as great, but he actually has been required to pay, in many instances, three, 
four, five, and in some instances ten times the interest rate which he ought to be charged or which is permissible 
under the law.”  Usurious practices included a thirty-day loan of $110 to a woman homesteader at a rate of 120% 
and the thousand loans made by a Texas bank at rates between 20-100%, even though, as the report surmised, “the 
funds [came] presumably from the emergency currency which the Government loaned to the bank at 3 per cent.”30  
Urban newspapers joined the chorus, publishing articles highlighting the financial vulnerability of market-oriented 
farmers and reporting regularly on the negotiations in Washington over the terms of new rural credits legislation.   
Awareness of the need to change the operation of rural credit markets extended into the banking 
community, and even commercial bankers acknowledged the financial disadvantages that accompanied the farm 
mortgage market.  Farm editor Herbert Quick penned an article in the Banker-Farmer suggesting “the business of 
                                                 
28 “See in Rural Credit a Big National Issue, Western Farmers Put Loans Next to Preparedness in National Contest,” 
New York Times, 10 January 1916, p. 6; another enumeration of high rates by state comes in Robert J. Bulkley, “The 
Federal Farm-Loan Act,” Journal of Political Economy 25 (February 1917), 130, which cites C. W. Thompson, 
“Costs and Sources of Farm-Mortgage Loans in the United States,” USDA Bulletin No. 384 (Washington, 1916). 
29 “Controller Urges Remedy for Usury,” New York Times, 11 January 1916, p. 4. 
30 “Controller Urges Remedy for Usury,” 4. 
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the country bank is hampered and disturbed by the lack of money in the community at low rates of interest to supply 
the long time needs of the farmer.”  Quick cited a country banker who explained the value of government-seeded 
loans to the larger economy:  “Our farmers are in need of money in larger amounts than we can furnish and on long-
time amortized loans which we can not make, in order that they may change their type of farming to a safer and 
more permanent agricultural basis.”  The consequences of an infusion of capital were clear:  as the farmer takes a 
long-term amortized loan he becomes “financially emancipated” and is able to invest in his farm, expand, and 
diversify, thus driving the economic development of his community.  Moreover, with a long-term mortgage, the 
farmer “is not anxious because of the mortgage which falls due in two or three years.  He can plan for 
development…  He will venture into developments which he would not dare undertake while facing a rapidly 
maturing mortgage….  This will make the farmer’s business in the bank better than before and make him a more 
desirable customer.”31  Quick was speaking directly to the nation’s bankers through the publication of the American 
Banker’s Association’s Agricultural Commission, and assuring those who feared government-seeded competition 
that they would find more benefit than harm from federal intervention in the rural credit system. 
During several sessions of debates over proposals to improve rural access to credit, Congress resolved to 
create more competition in the lending market, recognizing that high interest rates in farming areas were a pressing 
concern for both farmers and the nation at large.  Robert J. Bulkley (D-OH), one of the original co-sponsors of the 
Federal Farm Loan Act, wrote, “It is a problem in which the nation is even more vitally interested than the farmer 
himself, for availability of funds at reasonable rates is encouragement to the farmer to improve his lands and so 
increase his yield of foods.”  Bulkley enumerated the advantages of increased production, arguing that the 
improvement of farm operations “interests and benefits us all, for it is certain to increase our national agricultural 
productiveness.”32  Members of Congress recognized that agricultural production was not generally a matter of 
significant public attention, unless a dramatic weather event such as drought or flooding affected commodity 
markets.  Yet during World War I new exigencies emerged as the United States committed to sending food to 
Europe and developing overseas markets, and rural credits became a key element of the American war effort. 
 
Rural Credit for the Wartime Farmer 
 The wartime emergency, coupled with Wilson’s growing concern about securing the farm vote, precipitated 
rapid progress in the negotiations over the terms of a farm finance law.  The political logjam over competing 
versions of the rural credits legislation was broken in late January 1916 when Senator Henry Hollis (D-NH) and 
Representative A. F. Lever (D-SC), both long-time advocates of reforming rural credit, traveled to the White House.  
The purpose of their visit was to appeal for the President’s support of federal investment in farm loan bonds.  
Reflecting the press attention given to Odell’s New York speech, and abrogating on his earlier insistence on “special 
privileges to none” in an abrupt about-face that thrilled his guests, Wilson encouraged the legislators to return to 
                                                 
31 Herbert Quick, “Bankers and the Farm Loan Act—As Seen by One of Uncle Sam’s Board,” Banker-Farmer:  
Reviewing the Banker’s Activities for a Better Agriculture and Rural Life 4 (April 1917):  14, 15. 
32 Bulkley blended the benefits of efficient production with agricultural conservation in his argument for rural credit 
reform, arguing that a long-term mortgage provides the farmer with “a satisfactory sense of permanence in his land 
ownership and makes him the most interested and diligent conservator of his soil.”  Bulkley, “Federal Farm-Loan 
Act,” 131. 
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Capitol Hill and increase the amount of federal investment in the proposed land banks.  In effect, Wilson signaled 
his support for a rural credits law during this meeting after four long years of principled opposition.33   
Congress moved to reinvent the farm mortgage system in the following months, sending a compromise bill 
down Pennsylvania Avenue in mid-May.  Two months later, on 17 July, President Woodrow Wilson addressed an 
audience of farm state legislators and rural editors as he signed the Federal Farm Loan Act.  Wilson observed, “The 
farmers, it seems to me, have occupied hitherto a singular position of disadvantage.  They have not had the same 
freedom to get credit on their real estate that others have had who were in manufacturing and commercial 
enterprises, and while they have sustained our life, they did not in the same degree with some others share in the 
benefits of that life.”34  The President recognized the transformative nature of this law for the nation’s rural 
economy, even as he anticipated that his political future, as well as the American role in the growing international 
crisis, would likely rest on the votes of the farmers for whom the law had been drafted.  That November, the farmers 
of the Deep South and most of the West returned their votes for the Wilson, just as the new federal farm loan system 
was beginning to organize.  The political exigencies of the election year and world war led to the establishment of a 
network of lending institutions that, in modified form, continues to support commercial agriculture well into the 
twenty-first century.   
 
<Ins fig. 3 here.  Photograph featuring President Woodrow Wilson and the major proponents of the Federal Farm 
Loan Act, upon the signing of the law, 17 July 1916.> 
 
The Federal Farm Loan Act, entitled “An Act To provide capital for agricultural development, to create 
standard forms of investment based upon farm mortgage, to equalize rates of interest upon farm loans, to furnish a 
market for United States bonds, to create Government depositories and financial agents for the United States, and 
for other purposes,” was part of a suite of legislation designed to benefit farm and rural interests that the 64th 
Congress passed during the summer of 1916.  This program to promote agricultural production, marketing, 
transportation, and what historian James Malin called the “Agriculture Code,” also featured the Federal-Aid Road 
Act, which established a Bureau of Public Roads in the U. S. Department of Agriculture with funds to assist states in 
building highways—the farm-to-market roads that became increasingly vital to rural communities. Later in the 
summer, Congress passed the Warehouse Act, codifying a part of the Farmers’ Alliance subtreasury plan that 
permitted bonded warehouses to issue receipts against agricultural commodities to be used as collateral for loans 
from national banks.  This law was crafted to allow farmers to bank their crops until optimal prices could be realized 
from their produce.35  In combination with new low-interest-rate mortgages, these programs for rural producers had 
a significant influence on strengthening the hand of the farmer in national markets during the wartime boom. 
                                                 
33 Arthur S. Link, Wilson:  Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964), 225-26. 
34 “President Signs Rural Credits Bill, Declares Measure is One of Delayed Justice,” New York Times, 18 July 1916, 
p. 5. 
35 James C. Malin, The United States after the World War (Boston, 1930), 227-47; Link, Wilson:  Confusion and 
Crises, 350. 
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Alongside the other agricultural legislation of 1916, the Federal Farm Loan Act was designed to serve the 
commercial farmer, and its implementation was timed auspiciously to increase the wartime production of 
commodity crops.  The legislation provided a mechanism for blending government credit with private investment 
and distributing funds to worthy borrowers.  Its structure was reminiscent of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act, as the 
nation was divided into twelve districts, each served by a regional land bank that each represented a cross-section 
the nation’s diverse agricultural regions.  The U. S. Treasury invested $750,000 in start-up capital for each district, 
with Congress stipulating that the remainder of the funds to be subscribed by rural borrowers through their purchase 
of the stock of new entities termed national farm loan associations.  In keeping with the terms of the legislation, 
President Wilson appointed a Federal Farm Loan Board to organize and oversee the national system of land banks, 
and within weeks, it was at work coordinating the creation of a new system of rural credit in the United States.36 
These government-seeded loans represented both a new source of credit and a competitor to the life 
insurance companies and banks that had historically controlled most farm mortgages.  The amortization provision 
proved one of the most a revolutionary components of the legislation:  farmers were suddenly allowed to pay down 
the interest and principal in annual or semiannual installments, rather than regular interest payments and then the full 
payment of the principal at the end of the loan term.  In the past, farmers would take out a loan of $1000 for three 
years, paying interest only once or twice a year, with the principal balance of $1000 due at the end of the loan term.  
Often, that sum was difficult to reserve, and as a result, the farmer had to take a new mortgage, with new fees and 
commissions, and, consequently reassume all of the risk of the loan.  By contrast, an amortized loan of $10,000 over 
the course of thirty-five years would be paid off at a series of regular installments that composed both principal and 
interest, drawing down the total debt at a regular rate until it was paid in full at the end of the thirty-five years.  
Amortization exercised a significant effect:  the farmer-businessman would no longer suffer the consequences of 
earning a low rate of return in his savings at local banks, while he was liable for mortgage debts that were due at a 
rate that was at least 2-5% higher.37   
 
<Insert fig. 4 here.  Amortization table for a simple five-year loan, illustrating the principle of regular, consistent 
payments.  From Federal Farm Loan Bureau, “Killing off Mortgages,” 6.> 
 
The 1917 Federal Farm Loan Bureau publication “Killing off Mortgages” offered an elaborate description 
of the value of amortization, along with a series of tables that clarified the process of the process for farmers.  Using 
a straightforward framing of the concept, the pamphlet spoke directly to farmers: 
There is a word—a long word—which used to be very unusual, but which is becoming common now, and 
with which every farmer out to become familiar.  This word is ‘amortization.’…  What is ‘amortization’ 
                                                 
36 “As had been generally expected the public subscriptions were almost negligible, and of the total capital of the 
twelve banks amounting to $9,000,000, the United States supplied $8,891,270.”  Institute for Government Research, 
Federal Farm Loan Bureau, 12, 27-28. 
37 Federal Farm Loan Bureau, “Killing off Mortgages: A Description of the Methods of Amortization and Their 
Benefits to Borrowers,” circular no. 7 (Washington, 1917, 1920), 4-5; Taylor, Agricultural Economics, 180-81; 
Testimony of O. W. Dawson, farmer and loan broker, Great Bend, before the Farm Loan Board, Hutchinson, Kans., 
19 September 1916, p. 69. RG 103, 530:  54/10-11/00, Entry 4, Federal Farm Loan Board:  Minutes of Hearings, 
1916. NARA, College Park.   
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and what is there in it for a farmer?  The word ‘amortization’ is a cousin of a number of other words in the 
English language.  When a wound or a disease brings death we call it ‘mortal.’…  Insurance companies use 
what are called ‘mortality’ tables, which show the percentages of certain classes of people to die within 
certain periods of time.  All these words are derived from the latin word ‘mors,’ which means ‘death.’  To 
‘amortize’ a mortgage, therefore, is to put it to death.  The ‘amortization’ of a mortgage means, literally, 
killing off the mortgage.  Almost every farmer, therefore, must be interested in any system based upon the 
principle, first, of making it possible for farmers to get into debt on an economical and even a profitable 
basis, and at the same time of killing the mortgage off or getting out of debt by amortization.38 
 
Amortization, therefore, not only strengthened the farmers’ hand as he sought to weather erratic crop prices, 
weather, and uncertain markets, but it provided a predictable, even, and cumulative method of paying off debt.  This 
benefit was transformative, and it reordered the agricultural landscape two decades before amortization began to be 
adapted regularly in home mortgages under the New Deal Home Owners Loan Corporation in 1933. 
The proponents of the Federal Farm Loan Act aspired to equalize the lending landscape by subsidizing the 
creation of a system of mortgage credit in rural districts with federal start-up money and an amortized mechanism 
for distributing long-term loans to American farmers.  The key ambitions behind the law were increasing 
productivity, expanding land ownership, improving efficiency, and bolstering economic development.  The federal 
financing of the system was intended to be temporary and Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo emphasized 
that federal seed money was intended to stimulate investment, rather provide permanent capital for the federal land 
banks.  McAdoo stressed, “This is not a government bank.  The government is advancing this capital and 
inaugurating this system to give the farmers an opportunity to work out their own salvation and under their own 
conditions….”39 These federal funds provided the start-up capital for farmers low-interest-rate, long-term, amortized 
credit.  The federal land banks invested nearly thirty million dollars in new mortgages during their first eight months 
in operation, directly stimulating the rural economy and changing the structure of agriculture in significant ways.  
The timing of these loans was crucial for increasing global trade, as the Great War was wreaking havoc on the 
agricultural regions of Europe and grave food shortages threatened the continent, creating extensive new market 
opportunities for American producers.40 
 
Managing Rural Credits 
 Congress designed the Federal Farm Loan Act to be administered by a governing board with expertise in 
farm economics.  The appointees to the Farm Loan Board had long experience with rural finance:  Charles E. 
Lobdell was a lawyer and banker from Great Bend, Kans.; George W. Norris had worked as an investment banker 
and director of the Federal Reserve from Philadelphia, Pa.; William S. A. Smith, of Sioux City, Iowa, was a former 
farmer and expert at the USDA; and Herbert Quick, editor of the farm journal Farm and Fireside, was a native 
                                                 
38 Federal Farm Loan Bureau, “Killing off Mortgages,” 3.  
39 Statement of Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, hearing of the Farm Loan Board, Hutchinson, Kans., 
183. 
40 Whereas Europeans harvested 37 million metric tons of wheat in the early 1910s, by 1919 their production had 
dropped by 11 million metric tons, and European exports had been cut off.  A terrible grain shortage thus confronted 
Europe.  Duffin, Plowed Under, 55-56. 
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Iowan living in Berkeley Springs, W. Va..41  The legislation delegated to these financiers and agricultural experts the 
responsibility for directing the operations of the land banks, and the Board convened for the first time in August 
1916.  At this meeting—a mere three weeks after the President signed the rural credits law—the Board encountered 
a pile of mail comprised of “thousands of letters and other communications which had been accumulating in the 
Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture, the White House, and various other bureaus and departments, 
including even the Bureau of the Census and the Congressional Library.”42  Interest in the rural credit initiative was 
high, and by November the Farm Loan Board had received over 200,000 letters and telegrams requesting 
information about the federal land banks.43   
There were a wide range of administrative tasks associated with crafting a new network of land banks 
funded by this unprecedented combination of government and private capital.  During the fall of 1916 the Farm 
Loan Board mapped land bank districts (see Figure 5 for the map of land bank locations), appointed directors for 
each land bank, and approved the creation of national farm loan associations; in the process facilitating the 
distribution of money throughout the country that began in the spring of 1917.44  Over the course of a few short 
months the Farm Loan Board coaxed into operation an equitable, functional, and practical system of distributing 
credit to farmers across the country.  A central impetus for the structure of the land banks was the information 
gathered as the Board toured the nation during the late summer and fall of 1916.  Seeking “to ascertain the feelings 
of farmers and business men toward the new system of farm loans,” the Board conducted fifty-three public hearings 
to survey the rural credit situation.45  Rural credit markets were highly variable, and testimony before the Board 
indicated that rates of interest ranged from 5% to 60% per annum, and that rates were extremely variable; in some 
communities at 5% per year, and in other communities at 5% per month.46  With variation as extreme as this, the 
proponents of a more equitable system of rural finance saw great opportunities for improving the agricultural 
economy, and strengthening rural areas as well as the nation’s production capacity. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Quick was a native Iowan living in West Virginia.  “President Names Farm Loan Board, Banker, Economist, 
Farmer, and Rural Credits Student to Solve Big Problems,” New York Times, 28 July 1916, p. 6. 
42 Federal Farm Loan Board, First Annual Report of the Federal Farm Loan Board (Washington, 1918), 5. 
43 “Farm Loan Board at Work,” New York Times, 28 November 1916, p. 8. 
44 S. Doc. No. 500, 64 Cong. 1 Sess. “The Federal Farm Loan Act, An Act ‘To provide capital for agricultural 
development, to create a standard form of investment based upon farm mortgage, to equalize rates of interest upon 
farm loans, to furnish a market for United States bonds, to create Government depositories and financial agents for 
the United States, and for other purposes,’” approved 17 July 1916 (Washington, 1916). 
45 Federal Farm Loan Board, First Annual Report, 5.  Stenographer’s minutes were kept for forty-two hearings, in 
thirty-eight states. The Board held two hearings in Kansas and Iowa, and three in Texas, but none in the least 
agricultural and smallest states, including Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, and Vermont.  RG 103, 530:  54/10-11/00, Entry 4, Federal Farm Loan Board:  Minutes of 
Hearings, 1916, boxes 1-5.  NARA, College Park.  
46 Moreover, many loans with rates of 5-6% had commissions ranging from 1-2% to 1-3% per annum.  So over the 
term of a five-year mortgage, a commission of 3% per annum amounted to 15% of the principal sum borrowed, an 
amount that was deducted when the loan was effected, which meant that the borrower received only 85% of the 
principal and yet paid at the rate of 6% per annum on the full amount of the loan, in addition to paying for abstract, 
legal, and recording fees.  
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<Ins Fig 5:  Federal Farm Loan Board, “Map of the Federal Land Bank districts,” 1917.  First Annual Report of the 
Federal Farm Loan Board (Washington, 1918), 10.> 
 
The organization of the farm loan system was simple by design (See Figure 6).  Federal investment in the 
land banks provided essential start-up capital of up to $750,000 per bank, and Congress intended that these funds 
would be supplemented and eventually replaced by subscriptions from members of the National Farm Loan 
Associations (NFLAs) who wanted to invest in and borrow from this new system of cooperative rural credit.47  The 
individual NFLAs were charged with extending amortized loans for terms of between five and forty years to those 
farmers in their community they judged to be worthy credit risks.  These cooperative credit associations could be 
organized by a group of at least ten owner-borrowers who “own and cultivate farm land.”  Each participant in an 
NFLA was required to invest at least 5% of their desired loan amount in the association’s stock as a means of 
providing security for his own loans, and the local associations were responsible for evaluating individual 
applications for loans.48  Loan applications were then sent to the twelve regional land banks for a second level of 
review of each prospective borrower’s farm and mortgage security; the Farm Loan Board-appointed directors of the 
regional land banks were ultimately charged with determining the viability of the loans.49  Farmers who invested in 
the farm loan system had the option of refinancing their high-interest-rate mortgages, or investing in new labor 
saving machinery, buying new land or livestock, or improving their existing infrastructure.  The possibilities, 
especially in the under-capitalized sections of the country, were seemingly endless.50 
 
<Ins Figure 6:  This graphic charts the operation of the farm loan system, demonstrating how each farmer-borrower 
participates as a member of the organization.  From Herbert Myrick, The Federal Farm Loan System:  New Method 
of Farm Mortgage Finance, Under National Supervision (New York, 1920), frontispiece.> 
 
The Farm Loan Board’s investigation of rural credit conditions had reinforced the sense that there were 
ample opportunities to expand access to mortgage loans in many sections of the country.  In late September 1916, 
the Board released a statement explaining that most farmers were poorly served by existing credit markets.  “In 
                                                 
47 The Secretary of the Treasury emphasized, “This is not a government bank.  The government is advancing this 
capital and inaugurating this system to give the farmers an opportunity to work out their own salvation and under 
their own conditions….” Statement of Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, at the hearing of the Farm 
Loan Board, Hutchinson, Kans., 183. 
48 Institute for Government Research, The Federal Farm Loan Bureau, 16. 
49 Farmers could borrow between $100 and $10,000, with the loan totaling no more than 50% of the value of the 
land, plus 20% of the value of improvements.  “Federal Farm Loan Act”; R. L. Badl, “Agriculturalists Shun New 
Farm Loan Banks, Reports from All Over Country Show Complicated Piece of Federal Legislation Isn’t Proving 
Attractive and Old Means of Financing are Still Used—Resume of the Act’s Provisions,” Los Angeles Times, 19 
February 1917, p. 1.  
50 The terms of the law stipulated that “Loans may be made (a) to provide for the purchase of land for agricultural 
uses; (b) to provide for the purchase of equipment [‘improvements needed in the conduct of a farm to facilitate its 
operation, including teams as well as machinery, tools, and the like’], fertilizers, and live stock necessary for the 
proper and reasonable operation of the mortgaged farm; (c) to provide buildings and for the improvement [‘anything 
in the form of a beneficial structure, or any useful permanent physical change tending to increase the productive 
value, such as clearing, tiling, draining, fencing, buildings, etc.’] of farm lands; and (d) to liquidate indebtedness.”  
Federal Farm Loan Board, First Annual Report, 15. 
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every State visited… even the industrious farmer of modest means who had only a small farm… was unable to get 
farm credit on any terms.”  These credit conditions reflected not only the limited numbers of rural banks that served 
farming communities, but also a problem of scale:  small farmers and those with limited capital were squeezed the 
most by insufficient rural credit.  The Farm Loan Board concluded that its “investigation showed a widespread and 
imperative necessity for the long-time amortization loans at reasonable rates of interest, (not to exceed 6 per cent.,) 
provided for by the Farm Loan act,” arguing that an expanded system of rural credits would “greatly stimulate 
agricultural development, increase farm ownerships, discourage the growing evil of farm tenantry… increase farm 
productivity and enhance the prosperity of the farmer, and thereby the general prosperity throughout the country.”  
In sum, the Board assured the American public that the new system of rural credits would further the cause of rural 
reform.51 
As part of its program to extend the influence of the new banks as widely as possible, the Farm Loan Board 
also began an educational campaign to raise public awareness of rural credit conditions and to promote the federal 
land banks and the creation of new NFLAs.  The advocates for the land banks worked diligently to promote the 
benefits of investing in government-seeded loans, and the Federal Farm Loan Board produced over two million 
pamphlets that were distributed widely during its first years of operation.  “Killing off Mortgages,” “Financing the 
Farmer,” “How Farmers May Form a National Farm Loan Association,” and “New Mortgages for Old” sought to 
educate American farmers about the opportunities available for simplifying their financing provided by the Federal 
Farm Loan Act.52   
 
<Ins. Figures 7 A and B, “New Mortgages for Old” cover and page 1.  Some of the Federal Farm Loan Board’s 
publications took a narrative approach to promoting the new federal land banks.  Federal Farm Loan Board, “New 
Mortgages for Old” (Washington, 1916)> 
   
Newspaper coverage echoed and adapted these promotional materials, and a 1917 New York Times article cited 
Federal Farm Loan Commissioner George W. Norris as he “rejoiced” in the increases in production that would 
accompany cheap credit, arguing that the new law “will enable thousands of small farmers to get loans at a low rate 
and on easy terms who would not have been able to borrow at all under previous conditions.”  Norris predicted a 
reorientation of the rural economy, as “The obtaining of long-time loans will emancipate the borrowers from their 
economic thralldom to the supply merchant and the local banker and permit them to do safe and diversified 
farming.”53  As wartime exigencies demanded the increased production of wheat and other commodity crops, the 
federal land banks were positioned ideally to inject much-needed capital into the rural economy and to support the 
improvement of American farms. 
 
Credit on the High Plains:  The Federal Land Bank of Wichita 
                                                 
51 “Loan Board Found Need of Farm Banks.  Members Tell of Conditions Now Existing in New England and the 
West.  Interest Rates Amazing,” New York Times, 29 September 1916, p. 15. 
52 Institute for Government Research, The Federal Farm Loan Bureau, 28-29. 
53 “South Sets Record in Food Production,” New York Times, 18 October 1917, p. 18. 
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In the face of two years of extremely poor wheat yields throughout much of the nation, and the growing 
demand for grain in Europe, the Farm Loan Board was especially concerned with examining local lending practices 
on the Great Plains.54  Keen to assess the attitudes of commercial farmers, and to promote local enthusiasm for the 
system, the Board conducted a series of fifty-three hearings across forty-four states.  Kansas farmers had two 
opportunities to interact with the Farm Loan Commissioners, in the northeastern capitol of Topeka and south-central 
Hutchinson on 18 and 19 September 1916.  At the Topeka hearing, E. C. Johnson, the director of agricultural 
extension work at the Kansas State Agricultural College, offered an overview of both the condition of agriculture 
and the mortgage situation in Kansas.  Johnson reported that as of 1915, Kansans owed approximately $180 million 
in outstanding farm mortgages.55  Johnson cited USDA figures reporting that the average interest rate in Kansas was 
6.9% including commission, and yet he acknowledged that rates ranged significantly within the state, with 8.8% 
typical in western counties, and between 6.3 and 7% more characteristic of eastern and central parts of the state.  
Director of Agricultural Extension Johnson explained that these variable interest rates were attributable primarily to 
annual rainfall:  western Kansas, characterized by cycles of decent precipitation and high production followed by 
years with insufficient rain, represented an unstable investment.56 
 
<Ins. Figure 8:  Outline map of the major bioregions in Kansas.  The High Plains suffered the most from inadequate 
credit markets.  Schoewe, “Map of the High Plains, Physiographic regions and subregions of Kansas,” 1949.  Found 
in “Geologic History of Kansas,” www.kgs.ku.edu/Publications/Bulletins/162/04_uncomf.html (accessed 15 
September 2014)> 
 
In Kansas and elsewhere, local credit markets reflected both ecological and market vulnerability.  The 
inconsistency of yields in western Kansas (see Figure 8), as well as the rest of the High Plains, meant that returns on 
investment were erratic and cyclical, and consequently the life insurance companies and commercial banks that had 
long funded most of the nation’s institutional mortgages had bypassed the region almost entirely.57  In this case, 
climatic variability, compounded by undercapitalization and the limited number of urban centers, meant that the 
region was starved for credit.  In 1915 University of Kansas economist George Putnam chronicled the challenges of 
farm finance in western Kansas, explaining:   
                                                 
54 The Farm Loan Board visited forty-four states, only conducting more than one hearing in Kansas, Iowa, and 
Texas.  Federal Farm Loan Board, First Annual Report, 5. 
55 Putnam, by contrast, reported that by the end of 1913, life insurance companies had a total investment of $56.5 
million in Kansas, about 80% of the total mortgage indebtedness reported for Kansas farms in the 1910 U.S. census.  
Dr. E. C. Johnson, director of extension work of the Kansas State Agricultural College cited a USDA bulletin, issued 
31 July 1915, “which gives the average mortgage indebtedness of practically all states in the union and also the rates 
of interest.”  Putnam, “Farm Credit in Kansas,” 35; Testimony of Dr. C. E. Johnson at hearing of the Federal Farm 
Loan Board, Topeka, Kans., 18 September 1916, p. 5.  RG 103, 530:  54/10-11/00, Entry 4, Federal Farm Loan 
Board:  Minutes of Hearings, 1916. NARA, College Park. 
56 Testimony of Dr. E. C. Johnson, director of extension work of the Kansas State Agricultural College, at hearing of 
the Federal Farm Loan Board, Topeka, Kans., 6. 
57 Thompson explained:  “The semiarid regions of the Western States do not attract capital as freely as the farming 
sections farther east, where rain is relatively abundant.  Important sources of capital, including insurance companies 
and savings banks, often refuse to loan money on farm-mortgage security where the average rainfall is below a 
certain figure.”  Putnam, “Farm Credit in Kansas,” 34; Thompson, “Costs and Sources of Farm-Mortgage Loans,” 
13-14. 
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Land values are speculative chiefly because of the uncertainty of the wheat crop.  In several counties fully 
90 per cent of the total improved farm acreage is devoted to the production of wheat.  When good years 
follow in succession, settlers are attracted in large numbers and land sells at a high figure.  When drought 
follows drought, land values decline and there is a material diminution in the number of operated farms… 
and the uncertainty arising from the possibility of a crop failure is reflected in the current rate of interest.58   
 
Even when credit could be procured from local lenders, interest rates were high, and Putnam explained, “The 
highest rate reported by western bankers is 10 per cent,” but once additional charges were calculated into the total, 
“the actual rate is frequently usurious.”59  Statewide, Putnam reported that 35% of Kansas farmers were satisfied 
with interest rates, while another 57% found that rates were too high for profitable farming.  Discontent was most 
pronounced in the western counties of Kansas, where “4 out of every 5 farmers expressed complete dissatisfaction 
with the rate of interest they have to pay,” pledging that they would “try anything which offered the prospect of 
lower rates.”60  Testimony before the Farm Loan Board echoed these figures.  E. E. Frizell, a farmer and lender from 
near Great Bend, Kans., described the region’s need for increased credit to fund modernization:  “Our farms are 
quite large.  We need more buildings and improvements, more diversified farming.”  Frizell argued that the key to 
increased production was low-interest-rate loans for buying new grazing land to convert to crops, support 
mechanization, and to permit the consolidation of farms.  Frizell concluded,  “If we had a 6 per cent rate in the 
western third of the state, there would be a wonderful development immediately.”  Economists and farmers 
concurred that an increase in lending in conjunction with lower interest rates would benefit the western farmer, 
alongside those bankers and other businessmen who sought to develop the country.61   
During the war years High Plains farmers were keen to increase production, and they felt an increased 
urgency to put more land into wheat, anticipating that continued high prices would enable them to finance expanded 
farm operations.62  Between 1910 and 1920 investments in farm mortgages more than doubled nationwide, paving 
the way for the increasing capitalization of American farms.  Yields and the total acreage in production had been 
increasing steadily in response to advancements in machinery and biological innovations.63  As a result, conditions 
were prime for a mortgage rush under the new land banks, and following the passage of the Federal Farm Loan Act 
Kansas led the nation in the demand for government-seeded credit.  The Federal Land Bank of Wichita was the first 
of the twelve regional banks to open its doors, and the Farm Loan Board granted the inaugural national farm loan 
association charter to the Pawnee County Farm Loan Association of Kansas.  During 1917 Kansans received more 
                                                 
58 Putnam, “Farm Credit in Kansas,” 34. 
59 The department of economics at the University of Kansas conducted a survey of lending conditions in Kansas in 
1914 that proved the data for Putnam’s analysis.  Putnam, “Farm Credit in Kansas,” 28-29. 
60 Putnam, “Farm Credit in Kansas,” 32. 
61 Frizell was a director of the First State Bank and Trust Company in Tribune, KS, along with Charles E. Lobdell, a 
member of the Farm Loan Board.  Lobdell obviously understood a great deal about the credit situation in western 
Kansas, although all of the testimony in Hutchinson referred only obliquely to this connection.  “First State Bank 
History,” http://www.bankkansas.com/history4.htm (accessed 9 October 2012); Testimony of E. E. Frizell, Pawnee 
County, to the Farm Loan Board, Hutchinson, Kans., 32-33; See also the testimony of John L. Powell, Wichita, to 
the Farm Loan Board, Hutchinson, Kans., 105-06, for an urban businessman’s perspective on the importance of a 
strong farm economy. 
62 Cunfer, On the Great Plains, 124-31; Shideler, Farm Crisis, 14-19; Worster, Dust Bowl, 80-99.  
63 Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode, Creating Abundance:  Biological Innovation and American Agricultural 
Development (New York, 2008), 19. 
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money from the federal land banks than any other Americans, profiting from a rate of closed loans more than twice 
that of North Dakota, the second highest-funded state.64  The resulting influx of capital facilitated the plow-up of 
millions of additional acres of shortgrass prairie on both the Northern and Southern Plains during the following 
years, as well as a boom in wheat production that would have unanticipated economic and ecological consequences 
in the region for decades to come. The results were profound:  almost simultaneously, the decline in interest rates 
spurred by the creation of the federal land banks led to dramatic reductions in the cost of improving operations, and, 
consequently, the improvements in efficiency long promoted by agricultural economists and farm managers.65  
National newspapers were quick to predict the success of the Farm Loan Act, and the New York Times 
argued, “It will work a great transformation in the agricultural conditions of the whole country.  Neglected and 
undeveloped areas will be developed.”  Reporters reiterated the assertion that a diverse constituency would benefit 
from this financing:  “large holdings will be broken up, the number of homes will be multiplied, and the 
independence and thrift of the farmer will be advanced.”66  Many Kansas believed that economic impacts would 
prove even more pronounced on the High Plains, and one real estate broker from Dodge City testified before the 
Farm Loan Board that lenders had long refused to extend any mortgages in the region.  L. L. Taylor explained,  “I 
have probably 100 applications out there wanting money, and [the insurance companies] just write back that they are 
not placing any money in Morton, Grant, Stevens--.”67  Some eastern bankers surmised that national mortgage 
lenders simply would not extend loans west of the 99th or 100th Meridian.68  Into this semi-arid, credit-starved 
landscape stepped the new federal land banks, with their start-up capital from the U. S. Treasury, committed local 
investors, and diversified agricultural interests. 
 
Boom Times:  Yields Rise as Interest Rates Decline 
The cumulative impact of the federal land bank loans on the transformation of the nation’s lending market 
was dramatic:  the Federal Farm Loan Act created a new pool of money available with attractive terms and low rates 
of interest.  As a consequence, the land banks altered both the terms of loans and precipitated significant declines in 
interest rates for American farmers, especially those on the High Plains.  In September 1916, only three months after 
the passage of the Federal Farm Loan Act, Kansas lenders and borrowers were already arguing that the impact of the 
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Federal Farm Loan Act had begun even before the first NFLAs were formed.69  John E. Wagner (a self-described 
banker-philanthropist) from Larned, Kansas, testified that bankers had dropped interest rates in anticipation of the 
passage of the Farm Loan Act:  “It certainly has had a fine effect.  If this Farm Loan Board never made a loan the 
effect would be the same to the farmer, that it has forced down the rate of interest that he is compelled to pay.  It is 
making farm loans cheaper and will save millions because the very investor who is holding these loans today must 
either go out of business or meet the government rate.”70  A March 1917 article in Outlook reported that mortgage 
applications had declined in areas with historically high interest rates, and that “impending competition from the 
Government banks has made it necessary for [lenders] to quote the farmer lower rates of interest.”71  In 1918 the 
second Annual Report of the Federal Farm Loan Board summarized the consensus:  the new system of government-
seeded mortgage credits provided an “indirect benefit to every applicant for a farm loan through private agencies.”  
The result was “A distinct reduction, not only in the rate of interest on such loans, but also in the accompanying 
charges and commissions, was manifest almost immediately after the passage of the act.”72  By adding additional 
competition and flexibility in the nation’s mortgage markets, the federal land banks allowed farmer-businessmen to 
operate on a more equal basis with their urban counterparts.   
The broader impacts of the new farm loan system stretched far beyond the nearly $30 million in federal 
land bank loans closed between 27 March and 30 November 1917.  During these eight months, 1839 NFLAs funded 
amortized loans to over 14,000 American farmers at a fixed rate of interest.73  This first influx of loans went to the 
nation’s owner-operated, market-oriented farmers, those who were up to date with the latest developments in 
agricultural improvement.  Even more significantly, these mortgages went to farmers in the historically under-
financed parts of the country, “respond[ing] to the demand for credit in areas hitherto not emphasized by the leading 
                                                 
69 Taylor, who was in the real estate and mortgage business in Kansas, reported that mortgage brokers “been getting 
6 and 2 per cent until this farm loan law was passed, and immediately the land companies I represent cut their 
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paying 7.”  Taylor elaborated that the payment of the 1% commission was also being extended over the course of 1-
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mortgage agencies.”74  Nationwide the land banks’ fixed interest rate of 5% forced local lenders to compete with 
more competitive rates, freeing up millions of dollars in interest payments for other purposes.  As a result, these new 
government-seeded institutions reconfigured the farm mortgage business. 
The nation’s wheat producers realized the most dramatic effects of this influx of government money, and 
land banks in Wichita, St. Paul, and Spokane led the nation in loans.  Between March and November 1917, farmers 
working with the Federal Land Bank of Wichita (serving Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma) received 
$7.3 million in loans; the Spokane district (Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington) extended  $5.3 million in 
loans; and the St. Paul district (Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin) borrowed $4.4 million. 75  The 
figures for the Wichita bank highlight the importance of mortgage credit to the conversion of the Southern Plains 
from shortgrass prairie to wheat (Kansas cultivation of field crops rose 9.4% between 1916 and 1919 alone).76  
Between March and November 1917 Kansas led the nation in land bank loans by a considerable margin, with more 
than $3.59 million in farm loans, twice as much credit as the next-highest states, North Dakota, Washington, 
Oklahoma, and Montana, which received between $1.8 and $1.6 million in loans.77  Each new mortgage in these 
wheat-producing districts was invested in new land, machinery, and improvements, or used to pay off existing high-
interest-rate loans.  Almost overnight, these wheat farmers were able to realize their ambitions to fund increased 
acreages, new machines, or other efficiencies. 
Long-term mortgages from the new federal land banks played a significant role in the expansion of U. S. 
wheat production after 1917.  In this era of technological and mechanical innovations, new capital investments were 
of the upmost importance to wheat farmers, and the timing of this new pool of capital was opportune.  In early 1917 
the national government’s concerns about food production were reaching a crescendo, and the U. S. Food 
Administration began an urgent wartime campaign for increased grain production; simultaneously, Plains wheat 
farmers were seeking to regroup after a dismal harvest.78  Meanwhile, war-torn nations in Europe were no longer 
able to feed their population:  the Central Powers had cut off Russian wheat supplies, French and Belgian farms had 
been ravaged by trenches and battlefields, and millions of young men had become soldiers.79  Into this crisis stepped 
the United States government, which called for American farmers to increase their production of staple crops, 
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famously captured in Pare Lorenz’ The Plow That Broke the Plains as “Plant more wheat… Wheat will win the 
war!”80  The interventionist policies of the Wilson Administration played out dramatically in the agricultural sector. 
President Wilson stressed the importance of increased agricultural production, and he spoke directly to 
farmers in an April address to the nation:  “The supreme need of our own nation and of the nations with which we 
are [cooperating] is an abundance of supplies, and especially of food-stuffs. The importance of an adequate food 
supply, especially for the present year, is superlative. Without abundant food… the whole great enterprise upon 
which we have embarked will break down and fail….  Upon the farmers of this country, therefore, in large measure, 
rests the fate of the war and the fate of the nations.”81  Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo reinforced this message in 
a circular to the new federal land banks, stressing the “importance of cultivating every available piece of land,” in 
order to meet the exigencies of war.  Increasing production dramatically, in order to generate surpluses sufficient not 
only to meet the nation’s domestic needs and the demands of military forces stationed overseas, was seen as an 
imperative by the U. S. government and by many American citizens.  During the Great War patriotic duty and 
economic incentives came together and soaring wheat prices provided further inducements for increased production, 
especially once the Food Administration set a guaranteed price of $2.00 a bushel for the 1918 crop year.82  
The wartime boom in agriculture reflected a new level of organization on the part of the nation’s farmers, 
governments, and citizens.  Until World War I, the federal government had hesitated to intervene in agricultural 
markets, but this too changed during the war years.  Beginning in 1917 the Food Administration under Herbert 
Hoover engaged in a widespread campaign to increase agricultural production and conserve food supplies.  Farmers 
put in their largest crops ever, increasing dramatically the nation’s production of staple crops.  The resulting growth 
in crop production was remarkable:  in 1917 the acreage planted in cereals, potatoes, tobacco, and cotton reached a 
national record of 283 million acres; up eight percent from 1916 and a twelve percent increase over 1915.83  The 
efficiencies that came from increasing government support for agriculture, the assurances of stable prices for wheat 
even in the face of dramatically increased production, and the encouragement of surpluses reshaped the expectations 
of American farmers and consumers, and signaled a new era in American agriculture. 
Initially, the weather in the wheat belts did not cooperate with the nation’s geopolitical interests, and dry 
conditions diminished yields in both 1916 and 1917.  The 1917 Yearbook of Agriculture reported that the wheat crop 
of 1916 was “strikingly small,” and predicted that “on account of adverse weather conditions,” wheat yields would 
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also be low in 1917.84  Throughout the Southern Plains, where winter wheat prevailed, these dry seasons were nearly 
catastrophic, with winterkill scorching crops, leading to plummeting yields, and creating increasingly anxious 
farmers.85  The correspondence between the Farm Loan Board in Washington and the Federal Land Bank of Wichita 
referred repeatedly to damaging wind and dust storms.  The president of the Wichita bank, Dan Callahan, wrote in 
April 1917, “the wheat is blown out” in western Kansas and eastern Colorado, and that he had never seen “a worse 
Spring in this section of the state….”86  Callahan responded to a follow-up inquiry a few days later:  “To be honest 
about it, [I] have delayed a few days expecting we would get some rain.  We are having more wind and dirt than we 
have had for 25 years.  I have been out a few days myself this week, and the facts, between you and I, are that it is so 
bad it is almost impossible for men to work.”87  Drought and dust storms were regular visitors to the Great Plains, 
and dry conditions were no secret by the late 1910s.  What was notable about this period on the Plains—a function 
of the strongest La Niña event of the first half of the twentieth century—was that it came at a crucial moment as the 
nation was pushing to increase its wheat production, and was strengthened by an influx of capital that permitted 
farmers to ride out weather conditions with a new source of credit.  When weather conditions improved in the 
second half of 1917, Plains farmers were able to deploy new forms of credit and mechanize, consolidate, and plow 
up new land—spurring a dramatic increase in production, and profits.88 
The day-to-day challenges of wartime production played out beginning in early 1917, as the federal land 
banks were beginning to organize.  Young men, a crucial source of labor for American farms, were drafted into 
service and rising grain prices made fueling horse-power less economical.  As a result, the nation’s larger-scale 
farmers found new incentives to mechanize, and the increased availability of long-term credit drove significant 
increases in tractor purchases. 89  In 1910 there had been 4,000 tractors on American farms, and farmers purchased 
roughly 4,000 in each of the following years.90  The war years saw a dramatic surge in tractor sales, with 28,000 sold 
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in 1915, 50,000 in 1917, 96,000 in 1918, and 136,000 in 1919; in total there were 246,000 tractors on American 
farms by 1920.  These tractors provided a means of expanding production onto the ever-larger fields of the Great 
Plains, and demanded an increased investment in farm machinery with profound implication on rural finance during 
the coming decades.  The mechanical innovations of the 1910s and the wartime labor and feed shortage combined to 
drive the increase in numbers of tractors on the nation’s commercial farms.91 
Tractor purchases facilitated the increased cultivation of large acreages and precipitated a greater 
dedication to wheat production on the dryland farms of the Great Plains.  The expansion of tractor power onto the 
Plains was further propelled by the launch of the low-priced, lightweight Fordson model in 1917, new competition 
that spurred tractor manufacturers to race to drop prices in order to claim increased market share.92  Whereas the 
average cost of a new tractor in 1910 had been $1500, a 1918 Fordson was priced at $750.  Consequently, the 
combination of reduced costs, rising profits, improved technology, and increased mortgage availability led to a five-
fold increase in the number of tractors in Kansas between 1918 and 1922, from 5,000 to 25,000 machines.93  The 
financial implications of farmers’ investments in new farm machinery proved considerable:  new implements loans 
necessitated adjustments to financial calculations, and often required increases in production in order to make 
regular payments.  Machinery later became a liability when crop prices plummeted after the war, and during the 
1920s the need to make payments on the interest due on implement loans contributed not only to the continued 
plow-up of shortgrass prairie but also to the surge in farm foreclosures.94  The resulting surpluses, especially once 
the price floor was removed at the end of the war, led to dramatic declines in commodity crop prices, and the 
accumulation of vast quantities of unwanted grain on the Great Plains. 
In the immediate term, however, the surplus production on the Plains was hailed as an unequivocal success, 
and in late winter 1918, President Wilson delivered an address to farmers that celebrated the increases in production 
since the spring of 1917, when “planting exceeded by 12,000,000 acres the largest planting of any previous year, 
and the yields from the crops were record-breaking yields.”95  The dramatic growth in cultivated land continued in 
subsequent years:  by the 1920 census, the 6,717,000 farms in the United States were growing crops on 367,738,000 
acres—more than one-fifth of the total land area of the continental United States, and an increase of over fifty-six 
million acres since 1910.96  In Kansas, which ranked second in the nation in total cultivated acreage, the acreage in 
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field crops in 1918 totaled 22,588,000 acres, almost half of the state’s land area.97  Further augmenting this surge in 
cropland, Kansas farmers secured an additional $3.59 million in new land bank loans for new land and machinery, 
thus facilitating the increased production that proved critical for supplying food to civilians and soldiers in the 
United States and abroad.  By 1920 the Kansas wheat crop reached one hundred and forty-seven million bushels, up 
from a twenty-year average of eighty-six million bushels; this nearly two-fold increase revolutionized the state’s 
economy.98  Although the Kansas case provides the most dramatic demonstration of the impact of increased 
mortgage credit and higher crop prices on American agriculture, the pattern in this state played out to varying 
degrees across the rest of the Great Plains and the South. 
 
Reshaping the Mortgage Market 
The wartime boom in agriculture precipitated farm indebtedness and spurred additional investments in farm 
mortgages by land banks and other lenders.  Increased mechanization, new technologies, and the urge to maximize 
profit from high wartime prices all drove farmers to borrow more money to improve their operations.  Moreover, 
between 1910 and 1920, rising land prices and frequent land transfers more than doubled the nation’s gross farm 
mortgage indebtedness from $3.3 billion to $7.9 billion.99   
 
 
 <Ins Figure 9:  Map illustrating total mortgage debt.  Note the dramatic increase between 1910-1920 (first two bars) 
throughout the grain belts of the Midwest and the Great Plains.  Wickens, Farm Mortgage Credit, 14.>   
 
American farmers borrowed money for land and machinery from neighbors, national life insurance companies, and 
state and national banks, as well as the new NFLAs.  As of January 1919 private lenders, identified as “individuals 
and others” by the USDA, still represented the vast majority of mortgage holders, and these investors held more than 
$4,924,364,000 in additional farm-mortgage debt.   By comparison, commercial banks were the largest institutional 
holders of farm mortgage debt in the United States, with $1,030,240,000 in farm loans, while insurance companies 
held an additional $1,018,163,000 in mortgages.100  These life insurance companies spent the early years of World 
War I investing unprecedented amounts in farm mortgages, reporting an increase of $200 million in 1915 and 1916, 
and another $200 million during the first nine months of 1917.  Insurance companies publicized their contributions 
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to the war effort widely, reporting to the New York Times, for example, that 95% of their loans were made “in the 
States that contribute approximately three-quarters of the bulk of the country’s staple food products.”101   
Many analysts have argued that given the vast sums loaned by other types of institutional lenders, the 
federal land banks exercised a negligible impact on farm finance during the 1910s and 1920s.  And it terms of 
dollars invested alone, the twelve federal land banks’ mortgages totaling $156,214,000 pale in comparison with the 
nearly seven billion dollars in private and commercial loans made during the same period.102  Yet the common 
interpretation that during the war years the land banks were, as L. J. Norton argued, “unimportant, having just been 
organized and in the process of finding a modest place for themselves,” unravels when these loans are evaluated 
within the larger context of interest rates, amortization, and lending patterns in the wartime mortgage market.103  
Over the first twenty months following the passage of the Federal Farm Loan Act, the new government-seeded 
banks made a comparatively modest foray into the mortgage market, but at the same time, through their presence as 
a competitor in the mortgage marketplace these land banks exercised a major influence on interest rates nationwide, 
and especially on the rates and terms offered to borrowers by commercial banks and insurance companies.104  
Competition from long-term, amortized, government-seeded loans at 5% interest forced commercial lenders to 
adjust their lending patterns, and the widespread reductions in rates freed up additional capital for the nation’s 
farmers during the critical production years of 1917 and 1918.  By 1920, the usurious lending patterns described 
only a few years before were largely a relic of the past, and while average interest rates still remained higher in the 
South and on the High Plains, they had declined considerably (see Figure 10).   
 
<Ins. Figure 10: Farm-Mortgage Interest Rates, 1920, reflecting market corrections that responded to the 1916 
Federal Farm Loan Act.  Wigder, “Farm-Mortgage Interest Rates,” 106.> 
 
The immediate impacts of long-term, amortized loans at a low rate of interest were especially evident in 
those areas that formerly suffered from inadequate access to credit.  A 1935 study of farm mortgages correlated land 
bank loans with the average interest rate by state, demonstrating that in 1920 there was a conclusive “concentration 
of loans by the federal land banks in the South and West,” areas that had suffered the most from undercapitalization 
and high interest rates.  Economist Arthur Murray divided the nation into two parts, those states with medium 
average rates below 6.3% and those with rates above the average, and Kansas ranked seventeenth in the enumeration 
of the twenty-four “low interest” states; interestingly, the wheat states of Kansas and Nebraska were the only trans-
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Missouri states on Murray’s “low interest” list.105  Murray’s larger conclusions are consistent with other evidence, 
and he observed, “The federal land banks in the early years obtained the largest percentage of the loan business in 
the high-risk areas.”106  Whereas the federal land banks overall held only 3.8% of the total farm mortgage debt in 
1920, the proportion was 6.1% in Murray’s twenty-four “high interest” states (not including Kansas and Nebraska), 
as opposed to 2.4% in the “low-interest” states.107  These figures testify to the significance of land bank loans in 
those historically undercapitalized regions of the country that provided critical food and fiber during the war years. 
Not all commentary on the federal land banks was positive, however, and between 1918 and 1920 there 
were a number of political and legal assaults on the Federal Farm Loan Act.  While many lenders on the Great 
Plains had voiced early and consistent support for the legislation, local and regional bankers were not uniformly 
supportive of the developments in the farm loan field.  During 1918 and 1919 Midwestern bankers led a series of 
efforts to delegitimize the federal land banks and the new system of government-seeded credit.  In April 1919 the 
Prairie Farmer published an article freighted with meaning, “Gas Attack on Loan System,” that reported on an 
initiative to derail the farm loan system, led by Congressman Joseph W. Fordney (R-MI).  Fordney had argued:  
“The federal farm loan act is a farce.  The loans made by the federal land banks are such loans generally as prudent 
bankers and money lenders will not make.”  To this accusation editors replied: “the loan system is almost 
universally satisfactory, except to the mortgage bankers.  We would suggest that the Republicans better not monkey 
with the farm loan act unless they want to get in bad with the farmers….”108  In August, the Prairie Farmer 
continued its campaign against the opponents of the land banks in an article chronicling how the Farm Mortgage 
Banker’s Association was “out gunning” for the land banks.  This article dissected several critiques of the 
administration of these credit agencies, arguing that attacks on the federal mortgage system were unfounded and 
based on “falsehood and misrepresentation.”109   
In spite of the political turmoil featured in the Prairie Farmer and the halls of Congress, the consensus 
across the nation was that benefited borrowers as they were empowered to seek new sources of credit, even as it 
challenged commercial lenders to compete with the federal land banks as they encouraged existing mortgagees to 
refinance their high-interest-rate, short-term loans.  An estimated sixty percent of land bank borrowers used their 
loans used to pay off existing mortgages, while the remainder used their loans to improve their operations by 
purchasing land, erecting new buildings, and buying implements, equipment, and livestock.110  The NFLAs helped 
farmers modernize, and operate as their own bankers, while their new long-term loans and lower interest rates 
granted the flexibility to invest in the labor-saving devices and economies of scale that were believed to represent 
the salvation of modern agriculture.  The increased production temporarily bolstered regional fortunes, but it also led 
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the wheat belt into an unprecedented cycle of surplus production, and, eventually, foreclosures, bankruptcies, and, in 
the 1930s, drought and dust storms exacerbated by the vast acreages that had been put into production. 
 
Conclusion 
Acknowledging the importance of these new wartime sources of credit for owner-operated farms allows 
scholars to confront a series of new and compelling questions about the role of government-seeded credit in the 
transformation—and industrialization—of agriculture.  During the late 1910s the terms of the Federal Farm Loan 
Act created a network of new financial institutions that permitted farmers to develop an expanded and increasingly 
efficient agricultural landscape that drove down commodity prices and produced annual crop surpluses.  During 
World War I, however, it was not only the notorious “suitcase farmer” who benefited from this new system, but also 
those ambitious but undercapitalized farmer-businessmen who bought new land, new machines, and consolidated 
farms using new forms of low-priced credit.  The presence of a new force in rural finance—the U. S. government—
revolutionized the rural economy and led to the sustained manipulation of the formerly laissez-faire farm mortgage 
market through federal credit.  These consequences contributed to the reconfiguration of the Great Plains in ways 
that would prove definitive during the coming decades.  During the 1920s and beyond the continuing high levels of 
production and a new pattern of surpluses reshaped the landscape American agricultural production.  As a 
consequence, farmers and policymakers have been governed largely by a federal agricultural policy dedicated to 
managing regular surpluses of commodity crops since 1933.111  The environmental and agroecological impacts of 
these changes were sizeable, as many historians have recognized, and yet their political and economic impacts have 
been neglected for too long. 
As the data indicate, lending by the federal land banks represented a relatively small proportion of new 
farm mortgage debt during the war years, and yet the provisions of the Federal Farm Loan Act exercised an outsized 
influence on the rural economy.112  First, these government-seeded loans represented both a new source of credit and 
a competitor to the local investors, life insurance companies, and banks that had historically controlled most farm 
mortgages.  As a result, between 1916 and 1920 the average interest rate for farm mortgages came down from 
between 8 and 10% to between 5.1% and 7.8%, a clear demonstration of the influence of federally funded farm 
loans at 5% interest.113  Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the land banks’ innovations in amortization 
provided an unprecedented and decades-long cushion for farm investments almost two decades before a parallel 
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federal intervention reshaped the home mortgage marketplace.114  Third, the greatest impacts of the Farm Loan 
system were felt in farming communities that had long been neglected by institutional lenders—those on the 
margins of production agriculture, including the High Plains and the Deep South.  These undercapitalized regions 
proved instrumental to the war effort, even if their lack of native capital also signaled their ecological vulnerability.  
The availability of new credit spurred a rapid increase in the production of valuable commodity crops, which meant 
that the nation could export increasing quantities of grain and produce to Europe.  The cumulative impacts of the 
new federal land banks far exceeded the sum of their loans during the first few years of operation because 
competition from government-seeded mortgages drove the reorientation of rural lending, and, ultimately, 
contributed to the reorganization of American agriculture during World War I and beyond. 
 The story of the economic, policy, and environmental impacts of the Federal Farm Loan Act highlights 
some of the unintended consequences of manipulating financial institutions:  what originated as an attempt to offer 
expanded access to the national markets for credit proved essential for the improvement of individual farms, yet 
eventually contributed to a significant distortion of the agricultural marketplace.  The surpluses that resulted from 
the expansion in acreage and the increases in productivity during World War I carried profound environmental, as 
well as economic and political, consequences for American markets.  This government intervention in rural finance 
proved as influential as capitalism itself in fueling the development of agriculture on the Southern Plains, and 
contributed materially to the Great Plow-Up that transformed wheat production in western Kansas, Oklahoma, and 
eastern Colorado.  Yet in spite of the unanticipated results from this government program, the federal land banks 
proved pivotal in increasing access to low-priced credit, and thereby corrected for a long-time imbalance that had 
held back entrepreneurs and working people in rural America.  The creation of a government-seeded system of 
credit sped the emergence of a new landscape of production in the wheat belt, with it profound implications for the 
future of agriculture in the United States. 
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